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  Choice can be an extraordinary benefit or an immense burden. In some 
contexts, people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. For example, 
many people prefer not to make choices about their health or retirement plans; they 
want to delegate those choices to a private or public institution that they trust (and may 
well be willing to pay a considerable amount for such delegations). This point suggests 
that however well-accepted, the line between active choosing and paternalism is often 
illusory. When private or public institutions override people’s desire not to choose, and 
insist on active choosing, they may well be behaving paternalistically, through a form 
of choice-requiring paternalism. Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian 
paternalism, and a frequently attractive one, if people are permitted to opt out of 
choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to choose); it is a form of 
nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are required to choose. For both ordinary 
people and private or public institutions, the ultimate judgment in favor of active 
choosing, or in favor of choosing not to choose, depends largely on the costs of 
decisions and the costs of errors. But the value of learning, and of developing one’s 
own preferences and values, is also important, and may argue on behalf of active 
choosing, and against the choice not to choose. For law and policy, these points raise 
intriguing puzzles about the idea of “predictive shopping,” which is increasingly 
feasible with the rise of large data sets containing information about people’s previous 
choices. Some empirical results are presented about people’s reactions to predictive 
shopping; the central message is that most (but not all) people reject predictive 
shopping in favor of active choosing. 
 
I.  Respecting Choice 
 
Consider the following problems: 
 
1. Public officials are deciding whether to require people, as a condition for 
obtaining a driver’s license, to make an active choice about whether they 
want to become organ donors. The alternatives are to continue with the 
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existing “opt in” system, in which people become organ donors only if they 
affirmatively indicate their consent, or to change to an “opt out” system, in 
which consent is presumed. 
 
2. A private company is deciding among three options: to enroll people 
automatically in a health insurance plan; to make them opt in if they like; or 
to say that as a condition for starting work, they must indicate whether they 
want health insurance, and if so, which plan they want. 
 
3. A utility company is deciding whether to adopt for consumers a “green default,” 
with a somewhat more expensive but environmentally preferable energy 
source, or instead a “gray default,” with a somewhat less expensive but 
environmentally less desirable energy source, or alternatively to ask 
consumers which energy source they prefer. 
 
4. A social network site is deciding whether to adopt a system of default settings 
for privacy, or whether to require first-time users to say, as a condition for 
access to the site, what privacy settings they would prefer. 
 
5. A state is contemplating a method of making voting more automatic, by 
allowing people to visit a website, at any time, to indicate that they want to 
vote for all candidates from one or the other party, and even to say, if they 
wish, that they would like to continue voting for such candidates until they 
explicitly indicate otherwise. 
 
6. An online bookseller has compiled a great deal of information about the choices 
of its customers, and in some cases, it believes that it knows what people 
want before they know themselves. It is contemplating a system of 
“predictive shopping,” in which it sends people certain books, and charges 
their credit card, before they make their wishes known. It is also 
considering whether to ask people to make an active choice to enroll in a 
system of predictive shopping, or instead to enroll them automatically. 
 
In these cases, and countless others, an institution is deciding whether to use some 
kind of default rule or instead to require some kind of active choice. (I shall say a good 
deal about what the word “require” might mean in this setting.) For those who reject 
paternalism and who prize freedom of choice, active choosing has evident appeal. 
Indeed it might seem far preferable to any kind of default rule. 
 
In recent years, there have been vigorous debates about freedom of choice, 
paternalism, behavioral economics, individual autonomy, and the use of defaults.
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 See,  e.g.,  SARAH  CONLY,  AGAINST  AUTONOMY  (2012);  RICHARD  H.  THALER  &  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN, 
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Invoking recent behavioral findings, some people have argued that because human 
beings err in predictable ways, some kind of paternalism is newly justified, especially if 
it preserves freedom of choice, as captured in the idea of “libertarian paternalism.”
2 
Others contend that because of those very errors, some form of coercion is required to 
promote people’s welfare, and that the argument for choice-denying or nonlibertarian 
paternalism is much strengthened.
3  
 
These claims have been sharply contested. A possible response is that public 
officials are prone to error as well, and hence an understanding of behavioral biases 
argues against paternalism, not in favor of it.
4 The “knowledge problem” potentially 
affects all decisions by government,
5 and behavioral findings seem to compound that 
problem, because they suggest that identifiable biases will accompany sheer ignorance. 
It might also be objected that on grounds of both welfare and autonomy, active 
choosing is desirable even if people have a tendency to err.
6 On this view, people 
should be asked or allowed to choose, whether or not they would choose rightly. For all 
sides, the opposition between paternalism and active choosing seems stark and plain, 
and indeed it helps to define all of the existing divisions. 
 
 My main goal here is to unsettle that opposition and to suggest that it is often 
illusory. In many contexts, an insistence on active choosing should be seen as a form of 
paternalism rather than as an alternative to it. Some people choose not to choose.
7 
Sometimes they make that choice explicitly (and indeed are willing to pay a 
considerable amount to people who will choose for them). They have actively chosen 
not to choose. Sometimes people have made no explicit choice; they have not actively 
chosen anything. But it is nonetheless reasonable to infer that in particular contexts, 
their preference is not to choose, and they would say so if they were asked. They might 
fear that they will err. They might be aware of their own lack of information
8 or perhaps 
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Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1033 (2012); 
Riccardo  Rebonato,  A  Critical  Assessment  of  Libertarian  Paternalism  (2012),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346212. 
2
 See Camerer et al., supra note; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
3
 See CONLY, supra note; Bubb and Pildes, supra note. 
4
 See Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
5
 Friedrich Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945). 
6
 See Wright and Ginsburg, supra note. 
7
 An important clarification: My focus throughout is not on “not choosing,” which involves no choice at all, 
and which is different from choosing not to choose, in the sense of choosing someone else to choose on 
one’s behalf. One might not choose because (for example) of procrastination or because one wants to retain 
option value. See Ziv Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like 
Losing, 30 J. CONST. RES. 15 (2003). There is, of course, an overlap between the two phenomena: People 
might decline to choose because they are busy, do not want to take responsibility, or think that they might 
err. But choosing not to choose is a form of choice, and those who want to avoid choosing might be as 
adverse to that choice as any other. 
8
 On the effects of lack of information in producing abstention, see Tom Coupe & Abdul Noury, Choosing 
Not to Choose: On the Link Between Information and Abstention, 84 ECON. LETTERS 261 (2004). 	 ﾠ 4 
their own behavioral biases (such as unrealistic optimism
9). They might find the 
underlying questions confusing, difficult, painful, and troublesome -- empirically, 
morally, or otherwise. They might not enjoy choosing. They might be busy and lack 
“bandwidth.”
10 They might not want to take responsibility for potentially bad outcomes 
for themselves (and at least indirectly for others).
11 They might anticipate their own 
regret and seek to avoid it.
12 
 
But even when people prefer not to choose, many private and public institutions 
favor and promote active choosing on the ground that it is good for people to choose. 
To this extent, active choosing counts as paternalistic. To be sure, nanny states forbid 
choosing, but they also forbid the choice not to choose. Choice-requiring paternalism 
might be an attractive form of paternalism, but it is no oxymoron, and it is paternalistic 
nonetheless.  
 
If people are required to choose even when they would prefer not to do so, active 
choosing counts as a species of nonlibertarian paternalism in the sense that people’s 
own choice is being rejected. We shall see that in many cases, those who favor active 
choosing are actually mandating it, and may therefore be overriding (on paternalistic 
grounds) people’s choice not to choose.
13 When people prefer not to choose, required 
choosing is a form of coercion — though it may be the right form, at least where active 
choosing does not increase the likelihood and magnitude of errors, and where it is 
important to enable people to learn and to develop their own preferences.  
 
If, by contrast, people are asked whether they want to choose, and can opt out of 
active choosing (in favor of, say, a default rule), active choosing counts as a form of 
libertarian paternalism. In some cases, it is an especially attractive form. A company 
might ask people whether they want to choose the privacy settings on their computer, or 
instead rely on the default, or whether they want to choose their electricity supplier, or 
instead rely on the default. With such an approach, people are being asked to make an 
active choice between the default and their own preference, and in that sense, their 
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9
 See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN (2011). 
10
 See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY 39-66 (2013). 
11
 For a demonstration, see Bjorn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher,  Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and 
Responsibility, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 67 (2012). On people’s preference for flipping a coin, as a way of 
avoiding  responsibility,  see  Nadja  Dwengler  et  al.,  Flipping  A  Coin:  Theory  and  Evidence  (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript). Consider this suggestion, id. at 1:  The “cognitive or emotional cost of deciding 
may outweigh the benefits that arise from making the optimal choice. For example, the decision-maker may 
prefer not to make a choice without having sufficient time and energy to think it through. Or, she may not 
feel entitled to make it. Or, she may anticipate a possible disappointment about her choice that can arise 
after a subsequent resolution of uncertainty. Waiving some or all of the decision right may seem desirable 
in such circumstances even though it typically increases the chance of a suboptimal outcome.” 
12
 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 51-54 
(1980). 
13
 There is an irony here in light of evidence that people sometimes place an excessive value on choice, in 
the sense that their preference for choice leads to welfare losses. See Simona Botti & Christopher Hsee, 
Dazed and Confused by Choice, 112 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161 (2010). 	 ﾠ 5 
liberty is fully preserved. This approach has the advantage of avoiding the kinds of 
pressure that come from a default rule,
14 while also allowing people to rely on such a 
rule if they like. 
 
It is important to see, however, that whenever a private or public institution asks 
people to choose, it might be overriding their preference not to do so, and in that sense 
engaging in choice-requiring paternalism. This point applies even when people are 
being asked whether they want to choose to choose. After all, they might not want to 
make that second-order choice (and might therefore prefer a simple default rule). In this 
sense, there is a strong nonlibertarian dimension to apparently liberty-preserving 
approaches that ask people to choose between active choosing and a default rule. If 
these claims do not seem self-evident, or if they appear a bit jarring, it is because the 
idea of active choosing is so familiar, and so obviously appealing, that it may not be 
seen for what it is: a form of choice architecture, and one that many choosers may 
dislike, at least in settings that are unfamiliar or difficult.
15 
 
I also aim to show that whether or not people should favor active choosing, or 
should instead choose not to choose, depends on a set of identifiable questions, 
generally involving the costs of decisions and the costs of errors.
16 If, for example, 
people believe that private or public institutions lack relevant knowledge, are self-
interested, or are subject to the pressures imposed by self-interested private groups, 
they should probably favor active choosing, because that approach will reduce the costs 
of errors. If choosing is a benefit rather than a cost, because people enjoy it, there is a 
further reason for active choosing. In such cases, people should choose to choose. But if 
the area is complex, technical, and novel, there is a strong argument against active 
choosing, because that approach will increase decision costs and potentially error costs 
as well. Another question is whether people believe that choosing is intrinsically 
desirable or not.
17 Often they do, but choosing not to choose is itself a form of choice, 
and perhaps an active one (and may be intrinsically desirable
18).  
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 See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
POLICY 417, 417-18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (discussing impact of defaults).  
15
 A valuable discussion is presented in Barbara Fried, But Seriously, Folks, What Do People Want?, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1529 (2013). 
16
 This question is discussed in more detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding By Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2013),  and  in  the  environmental  context,  in  Cass  R.  Sunstein  &  Lucia  Reisch,  Automatically Green: 
Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 37 HARV. ENV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
17
 For strong evidence that people do believe choosing is intrinsically valuable, see Björn Bartling  et al., 
The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights  (U.  of  Zurich,  Dep’t of  Econ.  Working Paper No. 120,  2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255992. See also Rebonato, supra note, 
at 41 (“Failing to make (or rarely making) this important distinction between the outcome in itself and the 
full choice process (outcome plus the ability or otherwise of choosing) is at the root of the widespread 
absence in the libertarian paternalistic literature of a sympathetic treatment of autonomy.”). 
18
 Bartling et al. do not test this proposition, but there is every reason to expect that any such test would so 
suggest. 	 ﾠ 6 
There is undoubtedly a great deal of heterogeneity here, both across persons and 
across contexts.
19 Some people in some contexts would be willing to pay a premium to 
have the power to choose themselves, other things being equal; other people in other 
contexts would be willing to pay a premium to have someone else choose for them, 
other things being equal.
20 People tend to have an intuitive appreciation of these points 
and to incorporate them into their judgments about whether and when to choose. An 
investigation of particular areas often reveals both the force and the weakness of the 
argument for active choosing. Many restaurants, for example, do best with a large 
menu, offering people diverse items, but tourists in unfamiliar nations may well prefer a 
default menu — a difference that reflects the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. 
An interesting question is whether, in identifiable contexts, people are too willing to 
choose (for example, because of overconfidence) or insufficiently willing (for example, 
because of excessive trust in certain institutions). 
 
At first glance, it seems that the choice between active choosing and some kind of 
default rule, based on decision costs and error costs, should be made by people 
themselves, at least if the interests of third parties are not involved. If choosers choose 
not to choose, or if that what they would choose if asked, their choice (even if imputed 
rather than explicit) should generally be respected. To that extent, choice-requiring 
paternalism should be avoided. Unless there is some kind of market failure, including a 
behavioral market failure (such as “present bias”),
21 private and public institutions 
should not insist on active choosing when people prefer not to choose (just as they 
should not insist on a default rule when people prefer active choosing).  
 
An important qualification is that the argument for active choosing gains strength 
when learning and the development of values and preferences are important.
22 In such 
cases, choice-requiring paternalism might have real appeal. This point raises a 
significant cautionary note about any program that defaults people into goods or 
services on the basis of their own previous choices — a seemingly attractive approach 
that might nonetheless prove an obstacle to learning and to what we might consider a 
form of self-expansion, and even autonomy, by people in their roles as both consumers 
and citizens. In such cases, choice-requiring paternalism is no oxymoron, and it has 
strong justifications. As we shall see, some evidence, which I present here, suggests 
that people have an intuitive appreciation of this point as well. 
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 For a finding of a general commitment to the intrinsic value of the power to decide, cutting across a 
relatively diverse population, see id. 
20
 Ernst Fehr et al., The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
1325  (2013).  Compare  the  related  phenomenon  of  “reactance,”  which  suggests  a  negative  reaction  to 
persuasive efforts, produced in part by the desire to assert autonomy. See Louisa Pavey & Paul Sparks, 
Reactance,  Autonomy  and  Paths  to  Persuasion:  Examining  Perceptions  of  Threats  to  Freedom  and 
Informational Value, 33 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 277 (2009).  
21
 See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER 
MARKETS (2012). 
22
 As we shall see, however, there is a strong response to this argument: People can also learn from making 
the choice between choosing and not choosing. 	 ﾠ 7 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II explores how, and in 
what settings, active choosing might be required. Part III draws attention to choice-
requiring paternalism and shows that it is not a contradiction in terms. It explains that 
when people choose not to choose, active choosing counts as a form of paternalism, one 
that runs into both welfare-based and autonomy-based arguments in favor of freedom of 
choice (including the choice not to choose). Part IV investigates why active choosing 
might be desirable, from the point of view of both choosers and choice architects. Part 
V makes the case against active choosing. Part VI explores how the analysis must be 
altered if third parties are affected. Part VII offers a brief note on “big data,” predictive 
shopping, and presumed choice. It presents some empirical findings, suggesting public 
skepticism about predictive shopping. It also suggests that in ordinary market contexts, 
the best argument for active choosing is that choosers know best what they want, but 
that with the rise of big data, sellers may have equally good information, potentially 
supporting the otherwise objectionable idea of default purchases. Part VIII concludes. 
 
II. Varieties of Choice 
 
Many of those who embrace active choosing believe that consumers of goods and 
services should be free from government influence.
23 Of course they recognize that in 
markets, producers will impose influences of multiple kinds, but they contend that 
when third parties are not affected, and when force and fraud are not involved, 
government should remain neutral. They reject paternalism on government’s part.
24 
Perhaps it is legitimate for public officials to require the provision of accurate 
information, so as to ensure that consumer’s choices are adequately informed. But if 
government seeks to “nudge”
25 people in its preferred directions in other ways – by 
imposing default rules or embracing paternalism of any kind – it is exceeding its 
appropriate bounds. 
 
A. Three Possibilities 
 
But what does active choosing entail?
26 Consider three possibilities.  
 
(a)  Criminal or civil punishment for those who refuse to make an active choice. In 
most contexts, no one contends that if people fail to make a choice, they 
should be imprisoned or otherwise punished. The sanction for that failure 
is that they do not receive a good or service (see (b) and (c) below). But 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
23
 This is the general thrust of Rebonato, supra note. 
24
 Id.; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note.  
25
 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note. 
26
 I am understanding the term in a purely formal sense, to capture a response to a question about what one 
prefers. It would be possible to understand “choosing” in a more functional sense, to capture deciding for 
reasons,  as  distinguishing  from  simply  “picking,”  which  is  akin  to  tossing  a  coin.  For  an  important 
discussion,  see  Edna  Ullmann-Margalit  &  Sidney  Morgenbesser,  Picking  and  Choosing,  44  SOCIAL 
RESEARCH 757 (1977). As I understand it here, active choosing includes “picking,” and can occur even 
when people lack an antecedent preference. 	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there are exceptions. In some nations, including Australia, Belgium, and 
(before 1970) the Netherlands, people have been subject to civil sanctions 
if they fail to vote,
27 and in that sense they may be punished for refusing to 
make an active choice. So too, the Affordable Care Act requires people to 




With respect to active choosing, both of these cases do have a wrinkle: 
People are being forced to choose along one dimension (for whom to vote 
and which health insurance plan to obtain), but are being prohibited from 
choosing along another dimension (whether to vote or to obtain health 
insurance). But insofar as one kind of choice is being required, we may 
fairly speak of coerced choosing. We could imagine other contexts in 
which people would face sanctions if they do not choose, though 
admittedly such cases look more like science fiction than the real world. 
Consider cases in which people must decide whether to become organ 
donors (or face criminal penalties) or must choose privacy settings on their 
computer (subject to civil sanctions if they do not). The fact that sanctions 
are rarely imposed on people who choose not to choose might be taken to 
suggest an implicit recognition that in a free society, such choices are 
generally acceptable and indeed a legitimate part of consumer sovereignty. 
One reason involves information: People know best what they want, and 
others should not choose for them, even if the choice is not to choose.
29 
 
(b)  Active choosing with respect to a related or ancillary matter as a condition 
for obtaining a good or a service (or a job). Sometimes active choosing is 
mandatory in a distinctive sense: Unless people make an active choice on 
some matter, they cannot obtain a good or service, even though that good 
or service, narrowly defined, is not the specific topic of the choice that they 
are being asked to make. We can imagine a continuum of connections 
between the matter in question, for which an active choice is being 
required, and the specific good that has already been chosen.  There would 
be a close connection if, for example, people were told that unless they 
indicate their preferences with respect to car insurance, they cannot rent a 
car. So too, there would be a close connection if people were told that 
unless they create a password, or indicate their preferences with respect to 
privacy settings, they cannot use their computer. And indeed, both of these 
cases are standard. In markets, sellers sometimes insist that purchasers 
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 Lisa Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting A Solution, 18 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 207, 208 (2006). 
28
 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Note that by 2015, large employers will be required to adopt a form of 
automatic enrollment for health insurance. See 29 U.S.C. 218A. 
29
 For  a  powerful  demonstration,  see  Joel  Waldfogel,  SCROOGENOMICS:  WHY  YOU  SHOULDN’T  BUY 
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009) (showing that even family members and close friends make large 
mistakes in choosing for people during holiday season). 	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must make an active choice on some related matter in order to obtain or 
use a product. 
 
By contrast, there would be a weaker connection if people were informed 
that they could not work with a particular employer until they have 
indicated their preferences with respect to their retirement plan. The 
connection would be weaker still if people were told that they could not 
obtain a drivers’ license unless they indicate their preferences with respect 
to organ donation. The connection would be even weaker if people were 
told that they could not register to vote unless they have made a choice 
about their preferred privacy settings on their computer.  
 
In the final two examples, there is not a tight connection between the 
matter on which people are being asked to make a choice and the good that 
they are specifically seeking.
30 In cases of this kind, the choice architect is 
requiring an active choice on a matter that is genuinely ancillary. Note that 
in some cases that fall in this category, the requirement of active choosing 
has a strongly coercive dimension insofar as the good in question is one 
that people cannot easily reject (such as a driver’s license, a job, or a right 
to vote). The choice architect is, in effect, leveraging that good to ensure an 
active choice on some other matter. From the normative point of view, we 
might want to distinguish between public and private institutions here. 
Perhaps private institutions, disciplined as they are by market forces, 
should freely compete along this dimension as along others, and perhaps 
public institutions should hesitate before requiring people to choose, unless 
there is a close connection between the good or service in question and the 
object of active choice. 
 
(c)  Active choosing among goods, services, or jobs as a condition for obtaining a 
good, a service, or a job. For most consumption decisions, people are 
given a range of options, and they can choose one or more of them, or none 
at all. Unless they make a choice, they will not obtain the relevant good or 
service. They are not defaulted into purchasing tablets, cell phones, shoes, 
or fishing poles. Indeed, this is the standard pattern in free markets. When 
people visit a website, a restaurant, or a grocery or appliance store, they are 
generally asked to make an active choice. The default – understood as what 
happens if they do nothing – is that no product will be purchased. People 
do not receive goods or services unless they have actively chosen them. 
The same point holds for the employment market. People are not typically 
defaulted into particular jobs, at least not in any formal sense. They have a 
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 There is a counterargument in the case of organ donations. In 2007, for example, motor vehicle accidents 
accounted  for  about  20  percent  of  all  organ  donations.  See Stacy  Dickert-Conlin  et  al.,  Donorcycles: 
Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the Supply of Organ Donors, 54 J.L. & Econ. 907, 912 (2011). 
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range of options, and unless they take one, they will be unemployed. In this 
respect, free markets generally require active choosing.  
 
There is nothing inevitable about this situation. We could imagine a 
situation in which sellers assume, or presume, that people want certain 
products, and in which buyers obtain them, and have to pay for them, 
passively. Imagine, for example, that a bookseller has sufficient 
information to know, for a fact, that Johnson would want to buy any new 
book by Stephen King, Amartya Sen, or Joyce Carol Oates, or that Smith 
would like to purchase a new version of a particular tablet, or that Smith 
would want to buy a certain pair of sneakers, or that when Williams runs 
out of toothpaste, he would like new toothpaste of exactly the same kind. If 
the sellers’ judgments are unerring, or even nearly so, would it be 
troublesome and intrusive, or instead a great benefit, for them to arrange 




There is a good argument that the strongest reason to require active 
choosing is that reliable predictive shopping algorithms do not exist, and 
hence active choosing is an indispensable safeguard against erroneous 
purchases, and thus not in the interests of those who might be denominated 
purchasers (by default). On this view, the argument for active choosing is 
rooted in the view that affirmative consent protects against mistakes – 
which leaves open the possibility of “passive purchases” if and when a 
reliable technology becomes available. So long as such technology does 
not exist, passive purchases would be unacceptable. I will return to these 
issues in Part VII. 
 
The major qualification is that markets require a background set of 
entitlements, establishing what people have and do not have, before they 
begin to choose; the background entitlements are given rather than chosen, 
and they might reflect a form of paternalism. For example, people might 
have some kind of “default entitlement” to be free from age discrimination, 
which they can waive for a price
32; some entitlements of this kind (such as 
the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race and sex) are not 
waivable.
33 Because people’s preferences may be affected by decisions 
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 See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014, 
3:12  PM),  http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/17/amazon-wants-to-ship-your-package-before-you-buy-
it/?mod=e2tw. 
32
 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2012).  
33
 See also, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (holding that employees may not 
waive their rights to the minimum wage or overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
201-19). 	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about background entitlements,
34 a form of paternalism may be difficult or 
perhaps impossible to avoid insofar as some person or institution is making 
those decisions.
35 If people’s preferences are an artifact of entitlements, we 
cannot select entitlements by asking about those preferences. But with 
background entitlements in place, people usually do not obtain goods or 
services unless they have actively chosen them (putting gifts to one side). 
 
B. Sellers As Choice Architects 
 
As the examples suggest, both private and public institutions might choose (b) or 
(c), though of course only government can choose (a). It should be clear that active 
choosing is far from inevitable. Instead of imposing active choosing, an institution 
might select some kind of default rule, specifying what happens if people do nothing. 
Of course (b) and (c) also come with a kind of default rule: unless people make an 
active choice, they will have no good, no service, and no employment. But other 
approaches are possible.  
 
For example, those who obtain driver’s licenses might be defaulted into being 
organ donors, or those who start work with a particular employer might be defaulted 
into a specific retirement or health care plan. Alternatively, those who make an active 
choice to purchase a particular product – say, a book or a subscription to a magazine – 
might be enrolled into a program by which they continue to receive a similar product on 
a periodic basis, whether or not they have not made an active choice to do that. The 
Book of the Month Club famously employs a strategy of this sort.
36  
 
An active choice to purchase a product might also produce a default rule that is 
unrelated to the product – as, for example, where purchase of a particular book created 
default enrollment in a health care plan, or where an active choice to enroll in a health 
care plan created default enrollment in a book club. In extreme cases, where disclosure 
is insufficiently clear, an approach of this kind might be a form of fraud, though we 
could also imagine cases in which such an approach would actually track people’s 
preferences. Suppose, for example, that a private institution knows that people who 
purchase product X (say, certain kinds of music) also tend to like product Y (say, 
certain kinds of books). Suggestions of various kinds, default advertisements, default 
presentations of political views, and perhaps even default purchases could be welcome 
and in people’s interests, unfamiliar though the link might seem. For example, the 
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 See  Keith  M.  Marzilla  Ericson  &  Andreas  Fuster,  The  Endowment  Effect  (Nat’l  Bureau  of  Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19384, 2013), available at www.nber.org/papers/w19384. 
35
 I am bracketing the possibility that entitlements are a product of a “spontaneous order” of some sort, 
rather than of any kind of decision. 
36 See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 
377, 378-79 (1999) . 	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website Pandora tracks people’s music preferences, from which it can make some 
inferences about likely tastes and judgments about other matters, including politics.
37 
 
We could also imagine cases in which people are explicitly asked to choose 
whether they want to choose.
38 Consumers might be asked: Do you want to choose your 
cell phone settings, or do you want to be defaulted into settings that seem to work best 
for most people, or for people like you? Do you want to choose your own health 
insurance plan, or do you want to be defaulted into the plan that seems best for people 
in your demographic category? In such cases, many people may well decide in favor of 
a default rule, and thus decline to choose, because of a second-order desire not to do so. 
They might not trust their own judgment; they might not want to learn. The topic might 
make them anxious. They might have better things to do.  
 
This approach – active choosing, with the option of using a default -- has 
considerable promise and appeal, not least because it avoids at least many of the 
influences contained in a default rule,
39 and might therefore seem highly respectful of 
autonomy while also giving people the ability to select the default. For cell phone 
settings or health insurance plans, active choosers can choose actively if they like, 
while others can (actively) choose the default. Note, however, that this kind of question 
is not quite a perfect solution, at least for those people who genuinely do not want to 
choose. After all, they are being asked to do exactly that. At least some of those people 
likely do not want to have to choose between active choosing and a default rule, and 
hence they would prefer a default rule to an active choice between active choosing and 
a default rule. Even that active choice takes time and effort, and imposes costs, and 
some or many people might not want to bother. In this respect, supposedly libertarian 
paternalism, in the form of an active choice between active choosing and a default, 
itself has a strong nonlibertarian dimension – a conclusion that brings us directly to the 
next section. 
 
III. Choice-Requiring Paternalism 
 
A. Does the Nanny State Forbid Choosing Not to Choose? 
 
Is  active  choosing  paternalistic,  when  people  would  prefer  not  to  choose?  To 
answer that question, we have to start by defining paternalism. There is of course an 
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 For evidence to this effect, see Natasha Singer, Listen to Pandora, and It Listens Back, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
5, 2014, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/technology/pandora-mines-users-data-
to-better-target-ads.html?hpw&rref=technology&_r=2&,  and  consider  in  particular:  “During  the  next 
federal election cycle, for instance, Pandora users tuning into country music acts, stand-up comedians or 
Christian bands might hear or see ads for Republican candidates for Congress. Others listening to hip-hop 
tunes, or to classical acts like the Berlin Philharmonic, might hear ads for Democrats.” Id. 
38
 See Bartling et al., supra note, which shows that people will often say “yes,” other things being equal, 
thus supporting the conclusion that decision rights have intrinsic value. We can agree with that conclusion 
while also asserting that in some cases, the intrinsic value will be outweighed by the instrumental value of 
delegation (as, for example, where people believe they will err, or where people are busy). 
39
 See Rebonato, supra note. 	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immensely large literature on that question.
40 Let us bracket the hardest questions and 
note that while diverse definitions have been given, it seems clear that the unifying 
theme of paternalistic approaches is that a private or public institution does not believe 
that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps to influence or 
alter people’s choices for their own good.
41  
 
What  is  wrong  with  paternalism,  thus  defined?  Those  who  reject  paternalism 
typically invoke welfare, autonomy, or both.
42 They tend to believe that individuals are 
the best judges of what is in their interests, and of what would promote their welfare, and 
that outsiders should decline to intervene because they lack crucial information.
43 John 
Stuart Mill himself emphasized that this is the essential problem with outsiders, including 
government officials.  Mill insisted that the individual “is the person most interested in 
his  own  well-being,”
44 and  the  “ordinary  man  or  woman  has  means  of  knowledge 
immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.”
45 When society 
seeks  to  overrule  the  individual’s  judgment,  it  does  so  on  the  basis  of  “general 
presumptions,” and these “may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not 
to be misapplied to individual cases.”
46 Mill’s goal was to ensure that people’s lives go 




This  is  an  argument  about  welfare,  grounded  in  a  claim  about  the  superior 
information held by individuals. But there is an independent argument from autonomy,
48 
which emphasizes that even if people do not know what is best for them, and even if they 
would choose poorly, they are entitled to do as they see fit (at least so long as harm to 
others, or some kind of collective action problem, is not involved). On this view, freedom 
of choice has intrinsic and not merely instrumental value. It is an insult to individual 
dignity, and a form of infantilization, to eliminate people’s ability to go their own way.
49 
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 See,  e.g.,  PATERNALISM  (Christian  Coons  &  Michael  Weber  eds.,  2013);  GERALD  DWORKIN,  THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988). 
41
 For  a  valuable  and  relevant  discussion,  bearing  particularly  on  means  paternalism,  see  B.  Douglas 
Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral 
Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51 (2009). 
42
 Rebonato, supra note, is an especially helpful discussion. 
43
 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE MARKET AND OTHER ORDERS 384-86 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2014). 
44






 See also HAYEK, supra note. 
48
 For a recent version, see Wright & Ginsburg, supra note. 
49
 For an illuminating and skeptical discussion, suggesting that overriding choices need not entail a lack of 
respect, see CONLY, supra note. 	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Whether or not these objections to paternalism are convincing,
50 there are legitimate 
questions about whether and how they apply to people whose choice is not to choose. On 
reflection, they apply quite well, and so choice-requiring paternalism is no oxymoron. 
People might decline to choose for multiple reasons. They might believe that they lack 
information or expertise. They might fear that they will err. They might not enjoy the act 
of choosing; they might like it better if someone else decides for them. They might not 
want to incur the emotional costs of choosing, especially for situations that are painful or 
difficult to contemplate (such as organ donation or end-of-life care). They might find it a 
relief,
51 or even fun, to delegate. They might not want to take responsibility.
52 They might 
be too busy.
53 They might not want to pay the psychic costs associated with regretting 
their choice.
54 Active choosing saddles the chooser with responsibility for the choice, and 
reduces their welfare for that reason. 
 
In  daily  life,  people  defer  to  others,  including  friends  and  family  members,  on 
countless  matters,  and  they  are  often  better  off  as  a  result.  In  ordinary  relationships, 
people benefit from the functional equivalent of default rules, some explicitly articulated, 
others not. Within a marriage, for example, certain decisions (such as managing finances 
or planning vacations) might be made by the husband or wife by default, subject to opt-
out in particular circumstances. That practice has close analogues in many contexts in 
which people are dealing with private or public institutions and choose not to choose. 
Indeed, people are often willing to pay others a great deal to make their choices for them. 
But even when there is no explicit payment or grant of the power of agency, people might 
well prefer a situation in which they are relieved of the obligation to choose, because 
such relief will reduce decision costs, error costs, or both. 
 
Suppose, for example, that Jones believes that he is not likely to make a good choice 
about his retirement plan, and that he would therefore prefer a default rule, chosen by 
someone who is a specialist in the subject at hand. In Mill’s terms: Doesn’t Jones know 
best?  Or  suppose  that  Smith  is  exceedingly  busy,  and  wants  to  focus  on  her  most 
important concerns, not on a question about the right health insurance plan for her, or 
even about the right privacy setting on her computer. Doesn’t Mill’s argument support 
respect for Smith’s choice? In such cases, the welfarist arguments seem to argue in favor 
of deference to the chooser’s choice, even if that choice is not to choose. If we believe in 
freedom of choice on the ground that people are uniquely situated to know what is best 
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 For  detailed  discussion,  see  id.;  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  WHY  NUDGE?  THE  POLITICS  OF  LIBERTARIAN 
PATERNALISM (2014). 
51
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for them,
55 then that very argument should support respect for people when they freely 
choose not to choose. 
 
Or  suppose  that  Winston,  exercising  his  or  her  autonomy,  decides  to  delegate 
decisionmaking authority to someone else, and thus to relinquish the power to choose, in 
a context that involves health insurance, energy providers, privacy, or credit card plans. Is 
it an insult to Winston’s dignity, or instead a way of honoring it, if a private or public 
institution refuses to respect that choice? It is at least plausible to suppose that respect for 
autonomy requires respect for people’s decisions about whether and when to choose. 
That view seems especially reasonable in view of the fact that people are in a position to 
make countless decisions, and they might well decide that they would like to exercise 




But are people genuinely bothered by the existence of default rules, or would they be 
bothered if they were made aware that such rules had been chosen for them? We do not 
have a full answer to this question; the setting, and the level of trust, undoubtedly matter. 
But note in this regard the empirical finding, in the context of end-of-life care, that even 
when they are explicitly informed that a default rule is in place, and that it has been 
chosen because it affects people’s decisions, there is essentially no effect on what people 
do – a finding that suggests that people are not uncomfortable with defaults.
57 
 
To be sure, we could imagine hard cases in which a choice not to choose seems to be 
an  alienation  of  freedom.  In  the  extreme  case,  people  might  choose  to  be  slaves  or 
otherwise to relinquish their liberty in some fundamental way.
58 In a less extreme case, 
people might choose not to vote, not in the sense of failing to show up at the polls, but in 
the  sense  of  (formally)  delegating  their  vote  to  others.  Such  delegations  are 
impermissible,
59 perhaps because they would undo the internal logic of a system of voting 
(in part by creating a collective action problem that a prohibition on vote-selling solves
60), 
but  perhaps  also  because  individuals  would  be  relinquishing  their  own  freedom.  Or 
perhaps  people  might  choose  not  to  make  choices  with  respect  to  their  religious 
convictions, or their future spouse,
61 and they might delegate those choices to others. In 
cases that involve central features of people’s lives, we might conclude that freedom of 
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choice  cannot  be  alienated  and  that  the  relevant  decisions  must  be  made  by  the 
individuals themselves. It is a complex question which cases fall in this category.
62 But 
even if the category is fairly large, it cannot easily to taken as a general objection to the 
proposition  that  on  autonomy  grounds,  people  should  be  allowed  not  to  choose  in 
multiple domains. 
 
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  choice  not  to  choose  may  not  be  in  the 
chooser’s  interest  (as  the  chooser  would  define  it).  For  that  reason,  choice-requiring 
paternalism  might  have  a  welfarist  justification.  Perhaps  the  chooser  chooses  not  to 
choose only because he lacks important information (which would reveal that the default 
rule might be harmful) or suffers from some form of bounded rationality. A behavioral 
market  failure  (understood  as  a  nonstandard  market  failure  that  comes  from  human 
error
63) might infect a choice not to choose, just as it might infect a choice about what to 
choose.  
 
A non-chooser might, for example, be unduly affected by “availability bias” because 
of an overreaction to a recent situation in which his own choice went wrong.
64 Or perhaps 
the chooser is myopic and is excessively influenced by the short-term costs of choosing, 
which might require some learning (and hence some investment), while underestimating 
the long-term benefits, which might be very large. A form of “present bias”
65 might infect 
the decision not to choose. People might face a kind of intrapersonal collective action 
problem, in which such a decision by Jones, at Time 1, turns out to be welfare-reducing 
for Jones at Times 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
 
But  for  those  who  reject  paternalism,  these  kinds  of  concerns  are  usually  a 
justification  for  providing  more  and  better  information  –  not  for  blocking  people’s 
choices, including their choices not to choose. In these respects, the welfarist objections 
to paternalism seem to apply as well to those who insist on active choosing. Of course 
welfarists might be wrong to object to paternalism.
66 But with respect to their objections, 
the question is whether the choice not to choose is, in general or in particular contexts, 
likely to go wrong, and in the abstract, there is no reason to think that that particular 
choice would be especially error-prone. In light of people’s tendency to overconfidence, 
the choice not to choose might even be peculiarly likely to be right, which would create 
serious problems for choice-requiring paternalism.
67  
 
Consider in this regard evidence that people spend too much time trying to make 
precisely the right choice, in a way that leads to significant welfare losses. In many 
situations,  people  underestimate  the  temporal  costs  of  choosing,  and  exaggerate  the 
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benefits, producing “systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, 
choice  freedom  on  task  performance  and  task-induced  affect.”
68 If  people  make  such 
systematic  mistakes,  it  stands  to  reason  that  they  might  well  choose  to  choose  in 
circumstances in which they ought not to do so on welfare grounds. 
 
My aim is not to endorse the welfarist rejection of paternalism; it is only to say that 
the underlying arguments apply to all forms of paternalism, including those that would 
interfere  with  the  decision  not  to  choose.  To  be  sure,  some  welfarists  are  willing  to 
interfere  with  people’s  choices;  they  may  well  be  libertarian  or  nonlibertarian 
paternalists.
69 The central points are that the standard welfarist arguments on behalf of 
freedom of choice apply to those who (freely) choose not to choose, and that those who 
want to interfere with such choices might well be paternalists. And from the standpoint of 
autonomy, interference with the choice not to choose seems objectionable as well, unless 




In which cases would it be paternalistic to reject a choice not to choose? Begin 
with (a) above.
70 Suppose that people are subjected to criminal punishment if they do 
not choose (for example to vote or to purchase health care) and that they wish not to 
choose. To know whether paternalism is involved, we need to identify the reason that 
people are being forced to choose. If people face some kind of collective action 
problem, and if coercion is meant to solve that problem, paternalism is not involved. 
But if public officials believe that it is best for people if they choose, and if they are 
punishing people in order to ensure that they do what is best for them, then we have a 
case of paternalism. Everything turns on the reason for the punishment.  
 
Whether or not people should be forced to vote or to purchase health care, there is 
a plausible argument that in both contexts, the goal of coercion is to solve a collective 
action problem. But we could easily imagine cases in which people are being forced to 
choose on the ground that it is good for them to do so, even if they think otherwise. 
Some of those who support both compulsory voting and the “individual mandate” for 
health insurance believe exactly that. In the latter context, the idea might be that people 
suffer from inertia
71 or fail to make a choice that will protect them in the event that 
things go unexpectedly wrong. 
 
Now turn to (b), which seems to involve many of the most interesting cases. In 
those cases, some choosers undoubtedly have a second-order preference not to choose, 
and active choosing interferes with or overrides that preference. Nonetheless, choice 
architects are imposing a requirement of active choosing in circumstances in which 
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some or many people, faced with the option, would choose not to choose. Is active 
choosing paternalistic for that reason?  
 
As before, the answer turns on why choice architects are insisting on active choice. 
In the case of organ donation, paternalism is not involved. The goal is to protect third 
parties, not choosers.
72 So too with a case in which a choice architect favors a default 
rule that reduces environmental harms; in such cases, third parties are at risk.
73 But 
suppose that as a condition for entering into an employment relationship, people are 
asked or required to make an active choice with respect to their retirement plan; 
suppose too that choice architects believe that it is good for them to do so, even though 
prospective employees disagree (and would prefer to be defaulted). If so, then choice 
architects are acting paternalistically. In such cases, those who insist on active choosing 
are hardly avoiding paternalism; they are engaging in it.  
 
It might seem puzzling to suggest that paternalism might be involved in (c). How 
can it be paternalistic to say that you do not own a pair of shoes, a tablet, an 
automobile, or a fish sandwich unless you have actively chosen it? The question is a 
good one, but it should not be taken as rhetorical; everything depends on the reasons 
that underlie the creation of a particular system of choice architecture.
74 To be sure, 
there are many justifications for free markets and active choosing, and a number of 
them have nothing to do with paternalism. Some of those justifications speak of 
efficiency and others of autonomy. But suppose that we think that active choosing is a 
way to ensure that people develop certain characteristics and tastes. Suppose that the 
idea is that choosers gain independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of initiative, and 
that a system of active choosing (subject to background entitlements) is desirable for 
exactly that reason. That would be a paternalistic justification. 
 
This view is hardly foreign to those who emphasize the importance of freedom of 
choice; it plays a significant role in Mill’s own defense of liberty.
75 It is also a cousin of 
an early defense of free markets, memorably sketched by Albert Hirschmann, which 
emphasizes that free commerce creates a certain kind of culture, in which traditional 
social antagonisms, based on religion and ethnicity, are softened as people pursue their 
economic interests.
76 For at least some of those who prize active choosing, the concern 
is not softening of social divisions, but the development of engaged, spirited, informed 
people. Those who favor active choosing often embrace a form of liberal perfectionism, 
embodied in the idea that the government legitimately promotes certain desirable 
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characteristics, on the ground that it is best for people to have those characteristics.
77 To 
the extent that active choosing promotes independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of 
initiative, it might be preferred on perfectionist grounds, even if people would choose 
not to choose. 
 
To be sure, it is not exactly standard to see those who embrace free markets as 
favoring any kind of paternalism, and it is often wrong to see them in that way, because 
other justifications are available, and because people often do in fact have a first-order 
desire to choose, certainly in cases that fall in category (c).
78 But suppose that private or 
public institutions favor active choosing, and reject mandates or default rules, because 
they want to influence people for their own good. Recall our working definition, which 
suggests  that  paternalism  is  involved  when  a  private  or  public  institution  does  not 
believe that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps to influence 
or alter people’s choices for their own good. If people have a second-order desire not to 
choose, and if active choosing overrides that choice, then paternalism is indeed involved, 
even in cases that fall in category (c). I will turn to some complications, for cases that fall 
in that category, in Part VIII. 
 
IV. Active Choosing and Not Choosing 
 
What might be said on behalf of active choosing and hence against choosing not to 
choose?
79
 The answer is fairly clear if the antonym is a mandate or a ban.
80 But suppose 
that the alternative is a default rule, which maintains freedom of choice. Why is active 
choosing better than that?  
 
Consider an analogy. In constitutional law, the Supreme Court has often spoken of 
the nondelegation doctrine, which forbids Congress from delegating its legislative 
authority.
81 The central idea is that Congress must choose, at least insofar as it must state 
some kind of “intelligible principle.”
82 Congress is forbidden from choosing to allow 
others to choose that principle. In this respect, the nondelegation doctrine requires a form 
of active choosing on the part of the national legislature. It is the institutional analogue to 
the idea that individuals should not choose not to choose. 
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The problem, of course, is that the courts have shown little enthusiasm for enforcing 
the doctrine, in part because it may be a good idea for Congress not to choose, for the 
same reasons that lead individuals to choose not to choose.
83 Congress may lack 
expertise. It might be busy and lack “bandwidth.” On some questions, it might trust 
agencies more than it trusts itself, perhaps because they are able to master technical 
details. Whether or not an intelligible principle should be formally required,
84 a legislative 
choice not to choose – in the sense of a choice to delegate considerable discretion to 
others – often makes a great deal of sense.
85 For courts to overrule that choice would not 
be exactly paternalistic, but it would count as a form of intrusion into judgments that the 
national legislature is often in the best position to make. 
 
In this Part and in Part V, I aim to uncover the factors that both choice architects and 
choosers might consider when they are deciding whether to favor active choosing or 
instead some kind of default rule.
86 At least as a presumption, the preferences of choosers, 
on that very question, should be respected. We have seen that if private or public 
institutions do not respect those preferences, it must be because of some kind of error on 
the part of choosers, perhaps in the form of a lack of information, perhaps in the form of 
some kind of behavioral bias. The considerations that might justify a refusal to respect 
the choice not to choose are essentially identical to the considerations that would justify a 
refusal to respect any other choice – with an additional factor, involving the importance 
of learning and of developing one’s preferences.
87 
 
We shall see that there are several strong arguments in favor of active choosing, but 
there is also a tempting response that falls somewhat short. That response is that in many 
contexts, people affirmatively like to choose, and active choosing is desirable for that 
reason. The premise is certainly correct. Sometimes people do prefer to choose, and 
indeed they would retain their authority to choose even if delegation would in their 
material interest.
88 This point argues strongly against coercion in the form of mandates 
and bans. But it is not clearly an objection to the use of default rules. If such rules are in 
place, people retain freedom of choice, and they can reject the default. True, it may be 
best to ask active choosers whether they want to rely on a default, rather than simply to 
rely on a default, but in either case, people are free to choose.
89 The strongest arguments 
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A.  Learning  
 
1. The basic problem. As we have seen, active choosing promotes learning and thus 
the development of preferences. Mill made the essential point, emphasizing that “the free 
development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being” and indeed 
that  “it  is  not  only  a  coordinate  element  with  all  that  is  designated  by  the  terms 
civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of 
all those things.”
90 Mill noted that conformity to custom “does not educate or develop . . . 
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human 
faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, are exercised 
only in making a choice . . . . The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are 
improved only by being used.”
91  
 
There is strong evidence that Mill was right. Libertarian paternalists often refer to 
the GPS as a prime nudge, because it helps people to find the right route while also 
allowing them to go their own way. But there is a downside, which is that use of the GPS 
can make it harder for people to know how to navigate the roads. Indeed, London taxi 
drivers, not relying on the GPS, have been found to experience an alteration of their brain 
functions as they learn more about navigation, with actual changes in physical regions of 
the brain.
92 As the GPS becomes widespread, that kind of alteration will not occur, thus 
ensuring that people cannot navigate on their own. This is an unusually dramatic finding, 
to be sure, but it raises the possibility that when people rely on defaults or on other 
nudges, rather than on their own active choices, some important capacities will fail to 
develop or may atrophy.
93 This is the anti-developmental consequence of some helpful 
nudges, including the GPS itself. 
 
Choosers may themselves favor active choosing, and reject defaults, for exactly 
these reasons. They might want to develop their own faculties. For their part, choice 
architects might know that a certain outcome is in the interest of most people, but they 
might also believe that it is independently important for people to learn about the 
underlying questions, so that they can use the “stock” of what they learn to make choices 
in multiple areas in the future. In the context of financial decisions, it may be valuable for 
people to develop the kinds of understandings that will enable them to choose well for 
themselves. The same point holds for decisions relating to health care. With respect to 
health insurance, choosers may wish to choose, not because they enjoy the process, but 
because they would like to learn, and perhaps choice architects believe that that would be 
a good idea as well. And while doctors might be tempted to choose some kind of default 
rule in difficult cases, and to suggest that patients ought to rely on it, they might reject 
that approach in favor of a strong presumption of patient autonomy, offering information 
but asking for an active choice, in part so that patients learn.  
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The point is not to suggest any particular judgment about these examples. It might 
well turn out that on balance, the justification for active choosing is unconvincing. But 
we could easily imagine a kind of science fiction tale, envisioning a Brave New World in 
which people are defaulted into a large number of good outcomes, or even choose to be 
so defaulted, but are thereby deprived of agency and learning. If some people fear that 
default rules threaten to infantilize people, the underlying concern lies here. And while 
the objection should not be overstated, there are certainly domains in which learning is 
important and active choosing is necessary to promote it. Here, then, is an enduring 
argument for choice-requiring paternalism.
94 
 
2. Self-narrowing. We have seen that these points raise concerns about any approach 
that defaults people into certain outcomes on the basis of their own past choices. 
Suppose, for example, that a political system defaulted people into voting for political 
candidates of the same party for which they previously voted (subject to opt out). Such a 
system would unquestionably reduce the burdens of voting, simply because people’s 
preferences would be registered automatically. We might well think that for many voters, 
that system would be desirable, because it would reduce the costs of decisions without 
much increasing the costs of errors. But there is a strong argument that it would be 
inconsistent with a goal of a democratic system, which is to ensure continuing learning 
and scrutiny by voters. 
 
If that goal is taken seriously, we would object not only to “default voting,” based on 
people’s past choices, but also to a system in which people actively choose to enroll in 
default voting, on the ground that the aspiration to learning and continuing scrutiny forbid 
even active enrollment into default voting. If people could enroll into default voting, the 
registration of preferences and values would, in a sense, be too automatic, because it 
would not reflect any kind of active, current judgment about candidates and issues. As a 
preliminary test of the question, I conducted a small experiment at a large university, 
asking about seventy students the following question: 
 
You live in a state that is considering a system of “default voting,” in accordance 
with which people could set up party-line votes in advance. In this system, they could go 
online, at any time, to partyvote.gov, and say that they want to vote for all Republicans or 
all Democrats in the coming election. What do you think of this idea? (Assume the site is 
completely secure.) 
 
A strong majority (79 percent) disapproved of the idea. Interestingly, over one-fifth 
approved of it, apparently on the ground that it would increase convenience. But the 
widespread approval testifies to a norm in favor of a more active form of participation. I 
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also asked a different group of people, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, the 
same question, and here the numbers were essentially identical, with 78 percent (of fifty) 
rejecting that system. It is possible that such disapproval merely suggests a prevailing 
social norm, which could be changed as technology evolves. But the norm might well be 
taken to suggest a defensible social judgment in favor of relatively active engagement in 
choosing among candidates. 
 
 Or consider the website Pandora, which allows people to identify a favorite song or 
singer, and which devises a kind of default music station on the basis of that choice. The 
website has many virtues, and it is a lot of fun, but there is a risk to learning and self-
development in any situation in which people are defaulted into a kind of echo chamber, 
even if they themselves took the initial step to devise it.
95 The same might be said about 
Netflix, which does not exactly use defaults (in the sense of playing music or movies 
even when one does nothing), but which assembles a set of suggestions, based on 
people’s previous choices (and evaluations). Netflix’s kind of fine-tuning, which allows a 
great deal of precision in the resulting suggestions, obviously produces large welfare 
benefits, because people see what they are highly likely to like (and can choose it – 
actively, not by default).  The question is whether the welfare benefits come at a cost, in 
the form of inevitable self-narrowing, simply because the relevant suggestions are based 
on previous choices, and do not encourage people to branch out. 
 
3. An objection. Let us step back from the particular examples and notice that there is 
a formidable objection to the learning-based argument for active choosing. The objection 
is that people do and should learn about whether to choose actively or instead to choose 
not to choose.
96 People sometimes decide correctly, and sometimes they err, in making 
that particular choice, as in making all other choices. It is important for people to learn, 
over time, about when they should be choosing and when they should be relying on a 
default rule (and accepting the force of inertia or the power of suggestion
97). That form of 
second-order learning is exceedingly important. The problem is that those who insist on 
active choosing, or even favor it, will reduce or prevent learning along this important 
dimension.  Claiming to promote learning and the development of values and 
preferences, they truncate such learning and such development about an extremely 
important set of questions. 
 
In light of this objection, the argument from learning must be more refined. It must 
be that in particular cases, it is especially important that people engage in first-order 
rather than second-order learning, because the subject is one for which they should 
accumulate some kind of “capital” – as, for example, by learning about what they 
actually like (in terms of, say, politics, art, or music) or by developing an understanding 
of certain matters that very much affect how their lives will unfold over time (in terms of, 
say, health insurance or investments). In some such cases, the argument for active 
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choosing may be convincing -- perhaps because people are subject to inertia or a form of 
myopia that leads them to favor a default. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that 
second-order learning might therefore be compromised. 
 
B.  Overcoming Error-Prone or Ill-Motivated Choice Architects 
 
When choice architects lack relevant information, so that the chosen rule might be 
harmful to some or many, there are significant advantages to active choosing, and 
choosers might appreciate that fact. Suppose that a private institution is producing the 
default rule, and it really does not know a great deal about what informed people would 
choose. In the context of ice cream flavors, tablets, cell phones, and sneakers, people tend 
to know what they like, and while advice might be welcome, active choosing is far better 
than an impersonal default rule. The same is true for many activities and goods provided 
by private institutions. Market pressures can lead such institutions to a good mix of 
default rules and active choosing, fitting the desires of diverse customers. 
 
Or suppose that the government is producing the default rule. If public officials are 
biased or inadequately informed, and if the default rule is no better than a guess, that rule 
might lead people in the wrong direction. Followers of Friedrich Hayek,
98
 emphasizing 
“the knowledge problem,” emphasize that public officials will inevitably know less than 
participants in the market do.
99
 An appreciation of the knowledge problem might well 
argue in favor of active choosing. The same point argues against a default rule, and in 
favor of active choosing, when self-interested private groups are calling for government 
to select it even though it would not benefit those on whom it is imposed. Active 
choosing is much less risky on these counts. If choosers do not trust public officials — 
perhaps because they do not know everything, perhaps because their motivations may not 




C.  Handling Changes Over Time 
 
Choosers might be aware that default rules are usually static, and if situations change 
over time, such rules might be suboptimal even if they were sensible when originally 
imposed.
101 By contrast, active choosing could be designed in such a way as to require 
periodic revelation of chooser’s preferences. In markets, such dynamism is essentially 
guaranteed. People purchase goods and services as they want or need them, and as they 
develop new tastes (for, say, soap, or sneakers, or cell phones), those new tastes will be 
registered at the time of purchase. 
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In theory, of course, default rules could also change over time. An all-knowing 
choice architect could project how tastes are likely to evolve, perhaps by generalizing 
from the behavior of large populations. We might know, for example, that young people 
are more likely to select certain retirement plans (with high risks over the short-term) and 
that older people are more likely to select very different plans. But in practice, and 
outside of the context of a few relatively clear cases, it might be hard to produce accurate 
projections. Even if this challenge could be surmounted, evolving default rules might less 
accurately reflect choosers’ situation than would active choosing. Choosers themselves 
might choose to run the risk of inaccuracy, especially if they are not much interested in 
the area at hand, or if the stakes are relatively low.
102 But in many cases, the possibility of 
changes over time argue strongly in favor of active choosing. 
 
D.  Heterogeneity 
 
Active choosing appropriately handles diversity. As compared with either opt-in or 
opt-out, active choosing can have major advantages when the relevant group is 
heterogeneous, so that a single approach is unlikely to fit diverse circumstances. If one 
size does not fit all for health insurance or savings, then choice architects might want to 
ensure that people make choices on their own. For this reason, active choosing may be far 
better. In the face of diversity, a default rule might be especially harmful, because the 
power of inertia, or the force of suggestion, may mean that many people will end up in a 
situation that is not in their interest. People might be far better off if they are asked, “what 
health insurance plan do you like best?” than if they are automatically enrolled in a plan 
chosen by their employer.  
 
True, freedom of choice, in the form of the ability to opt out, is an important 
safeguard against the problem of one-size-fits-all, but because of the effects of inertia and 
the power of suggestion, some people will stick with a default even when it does not fit 
their situation. And to be sure, a personalized default rule, designed to fit people’s diverse 
situations, might reduce the problem of heterogeneity. But design of personalized 




E.  Overcoming Inertia  
 
Because a decision is required, active choosing overcomes inertia, as a default rule 
will not.
104 Suppose that inertia and procrastination are playing a significant role in 
ensuring that people do not give serious consideration to the possibility that the default 
rule is not in their interest. If so, active choosing may be an excellent corrective, even if it 
is mandatory. Such choosing requires people to incur effort costs that might otherwise 
lead them to focus on other matters. Consider savings plans, health insurance, and 
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privacy settings. The problem with an opt-in default rule is that it will likely ensure that 
some people end up with outcomes that they would not select if they were to make a 
choice. A key virtue of active choosing is that it increases the likelihood that people will 
end up with their desired outcomes. For this reason, choice architects might favor it. 
  
V.  Against Active Choosing (and for Not Choosing) 
 
A. Which Track? 
 
Notwithstanding its potential benefits, active choosing could also create serious 
problems, and it is hardly the right approach in all situations. Often people benefit from 
not choosing. To see why, consider the words of Esther Duflo, one of the world’s leading 
experts on poverty: 
 
[W]e tend to be patronizing about the poor in a very specific sense, which is that we 
tend to think, “Why don’t they take more responsibility for their lives?” And what 
we are forgetting is that the richer you are the less responsibility you need to take for 
your own life because everything is taken care for you. And the poorer you are the 
more you have to be responsible for everything about your life . . . Stop berating 
people for not being responsible and start to think of ways instead of providing the 
poor with the luxury that we all have, which is that a lot of decisions are taken for us. 
If we do nothing, we are on the right track. For most of the poor, if they do nothing, 
they are on the wrong track.
105 
 
Duflo’s central claim is that people who are well off do not have to be responsible 
for a wide range of things, because others are making the relevant decisions, and to their 
benefit. In countless domains, choices are in fact “taken for us,” and such steps not only 
increase our welfare but also promote our autonomy, because we are freed up to spend 
our time on other matters.
106 We do not have to decide how and whether to make water 
safe to drink or air safe to breathe; we do not have to decide whether to build roads and 
refrigerators and airplanes; the Constitution settles the basic structure of the federal 
government, and we revisit that structure rarely if at all; the alphabet is given to us, not 
chosen by us. It is true and important that we may participate in numerous decisions 
through politics and markets. But often we rely on the fact that choices are made by 
others and we go about our business without troubling ourselves about them. This is a 
blessing, not a curse. 
 
B. Burdens on Choosers 
 
These points suggest a serious problem with active choosing, which is that it can 
impose large burdens on choosers. As we have seen, many people do not welcome those 
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burdens. Suppose that the situation is unfamiliar and complicated. Suppose that people 
lack information or experience. If so, active choosing may impose unjustified or 
excessive costs on people; it might produce frustration and appear to require pointless red 
tape. Most consumers would not much like it if, at the time of purchase, they had to 
choose every feature of their cell phone plan or all of their computer’s initial settings. The 
existence of defaults saves people a lot of time, and most of them may well be sensible 
and suitable. Few consumers would like to spend the time required to obtain relevant 
information and to decide what choice to make. As compared with a default rule, active 
choosing increases the costs of decisions, sometimes significantly. In the process, active 
choosing can increase “decision fatigue,”
107 thus creating problems for other, potentially 
more important decisions. 
 
C. Burdens on Providers 
 
At the same time, active choosing can impose large burdens on providers. Choosers 
may not particularly care about those burdens, but they can end up having a range of 
adverse effects on choosers of all kinds. The basic point is that defaults can be desirable 
and even important for those who provide goods or services. The reason is that they avoid 
costs, which might result in increases in prices (and thus harm consumers as well). 
Without a series of default rules, and with constant active choosing, significant resources 
might have to be devoted to patient, tedious explanations and to elaborating the various 
options with consumers or users, who might not welcome the exercise. The experience of 
buying a cell phone or a laptop might be horrific if active choosing were required for 
every product characteristic. We could easily imagine a bit of science fiction, or perhaps 




A final point, emphasized perhaps above all by those who prefer not to choose, is 
that active choosing can increase errors. The goal of active choosing is to make people 
better off by overcoming the potential mistakes of choice architects. But if the area is 
unfamiliar, highly technical, and confusing, active choosing might have the opposite 
effect. If consumers are required to answer a set of technical questions, and if the choice 
architects know what they are doing, then people will probably enjoy better outcomes 
with defaults. Perhaps it would be best to rely on experiments or pilot studies that elicit 
choices from informed people, and then to use those choices to build defaults. But if 
choice architects have technical expertise, and are trustworthy, there is a question 
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E.  A Brief Accounting 
 
A simple framework, investigating the costs of decisions and the costs of errors, 
helps to explain when it make sense to choose, and when it makes sense to choose not to 
do so. That framework clarifies the decisions of choice architects as well.  
 
To the extent that the area is unfamiliar and confusing, default rules are desirable, 
because they reduce both decision costs and error costs. But if choice architects are 
ignorant or biased, they will not be in good position to devise accurate default rules, and 
hence active choosing seems best. To the extent that there is relevant heterogeneity 
within the population of choosers, active choosing has real advantages, because it 
diminishes error costs. To the extent that preferences and situations change over time, 
there is a strong argument for active choosing, on the ground that any default rule may 
well become anachronistic. The value of learning, and of development of tastes and 
preferences, may well argue on behalf of active choosing as well – a general theme that 
has run throughout the discussion and that argues against choosing not to choose. 
 
In view of these considerations, a promising approach is often to ask people to make 
an active choice, but to inform them that they can rely on a default rule if they like. Under 
this approach, active choice is essentially the default, but people can reject it. Sometimes 
this approach minimizes decision costs and error costs, and it can also be seen to protect 
people’s autonomy as well (as a default rule, standing by itself, might not
108). These 
points should not be taken to suggest that active choosing, with a default rule alternative, 
is the right approach for all times and places. Sometimes a simple default rule is better. 
But active choosing with a default is often worth careful consideration. 
 
VI. Third Parties 
 
Throughout the discussion, I have assumed that the welfare of choosers is all that is 
at stake, and that the choice between active choosing and a default rule is best assessed 
by reference to choosers’ welfare. In some cases, however, the interests of third parties 




The first involves externalities. Return to the organ donation example. A choice 
architect might conclude that if the welfare of choosers is all that matters, active choosing 
is the best approach, or perhaps active choosing with an option to select the default rule. 
But suppose that with this approach, hundreds or even thousands of lives will be lost that 
would be saved with a pro-donation default rule.
109 For that very reason, the choice 
architect might give serious consideration to that default rule, even if the case for active 
choosing would otherwise be quite strong.  
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Or consider the case of energy supplier. Suppose that from the standpoint of the 
consumer, the best approach is to require active choosing between various providers, on 
the ground that different options (involving varying costs and varying environmental 
effects) will suit different people’s values and situations. But suppose as well that greener 
energy sources would avoid significant environmental harms. If so, the argument for 
green defaults might be overwhelming.
110 
 
It is true that in both cases, and in others in which externalities are involved, a 
mandate or ban might be justified or required, because it will maximize net benefits. If 
the externalities are large, we have a standard market failure, calling for regulation that 
goes well beyond a default rule. But suppose that the externalities are not entirely clear, 
or that the obligations of choosers are complex and contested (as in the organ donor 
case), or that there are political obstacles to the use of mandates or bans. If so, a default 
rule, designed to address the likely externalities, might well be preferable to active 
choosing. 
 
B. Psychology, Responsibility, and Choice 
 
The second point involves the potentially profound psychological differences 
between active choosing and defaults, and the effects of those differences on other 
people. Active choosing offers distinctive signals and has a distinctive meaning. With an 
active choice, the chooser takes full responsibility, and his intended decision is 
unambiguous, at least along a potentially relevant dimension. With a default rule, by 
contrast, both responsibility
111 and intention can be murkier. We might not quite know 
what the chooser wants, because inertia and inattention might be responsible for his 
apparent decision. This difference matters.  
 
Suppose, for example, that someone is defaulted into being an organ donor, or into a 
“no heroic measures” approach toward extension of his own life. In such circumstances, a 
responsible family member might well hesitate before honoring the relevant “choices,” 
for exactly the same reasons that mandate the use of quotation marks around that word. If 
what is sought is a clear expression of the chooser’s actual will, and if other people will 
not take any apparent decision as authentic without such an expression, then there is a 
strong argument for active choosing — and hence for choice-requiring paternalism. 
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There are associated questions of guilt and regret, and these may argue either for or 
against active choosing. Suppose that a family member is herself deciding whether to 
take heroic measures to extend the life of someone she loves. If that family member is 
required to make an active choice, her responsibility is clear; it is hers alone. If, by 
contrast, a default rule goes one way or the other, the chooser can reasonably rely on or 
refer to a system-wide judgment, serving to diffuse her responsibility and also to carry a 
kind of authority that legitimately influences her choice. The family member might well 
appreciate such effects. At the same time, we can easily imagine settings in which it is 
important to place the responsibility fully in the chooser’s hands, partly to protect third 
parties or whole systems; return to the case of voting, where a default rule would be 
objectionable in part because it intrudes on that responsibility.  
 
VII.  Predictive Purchases? Notes on “Big Data” 
 
A. “The Chief Basis of the Argument for Liberty”? 
 
We have seen that in free markets, people do not obtain goods and services unless 
they choose them. In that domain, active choosing is the rule. As a general rule, we do 
not own things by default, whether they are cell phones, sneakers, soap, tennis racquets, 
or automobiles. 
 
But why, exactly, is this so? Why is active choosing required? An obvious answer is 
that unless people have actually said that they want some good or service, we cannot 
know what they want and whether and when they want it. No planner can possibly have 
the requisite knowledge.
112 Active choosing and the resulting freedom are, on this view, 
indispensable welfarist safeguards against error, understood as mistaken judgments about 
what people want. If, for example, a bookseller presumed that a consumer wanted certain 
books, and defaulted them into ownership (subject to opt-out), there would be an undue 
risk that people would end up with books that they do not want. By requiring active 
choosing in ordinary markets, we minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs. 
Consider Hayek’s remarkable suggestion that “the awareness of our irremediable 
ignorance of most of what is known to somebody [who is a planner] is the chief basis of 
the argument for liberty.”
113 
 
One understanding of this suggestion, with the reference to liberty, is that active 
choosing is necessary to protect autonomy,
114 not welfare, as reflected in the view that 
without some affirmative statement of intention, people should not find themselves 
forced (or assumed) to purchase goods or services. But the welfarist account itself seems 
especially straightforward. Some people might think that the autonomy argument is a 
shorthand way of capturing that account, and not in any way independent – a point to 
which I will return. 
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To test these claims, let us consider a thought experiment, signaled above, in which 
sellers know, with perfect or near-perfect certainty, what people would want to buy.  
Suppose that “big data,” understood as immense data sets about people’s past 
decisions,
115 helps to ensure that level of accuracy.
116 Suppose that on the basis of such 
decisions, a bookseller knows what people will buy before they know themselves. If so, 
the welfarist conclusion seems clear: People should be defaulted into those purchases. 
 
The reason is that this approach reduces (and even eliminates) decision costs
117 and 
by hypothesis, has zero or near-zero error costs. It is tempting to think that such defaults, 
leading to a form of “predictive shopping” or “as if shopping,” are also unacceptable 
from the standpoint of autonomy, but the temptation should be resisted. We are speaking 
of cases in which we know, with perfect or near-perfect certainty, what people want. 
From the standpoint of autonomy, what is the problem? In such cases, it might well seem 
that rational people would choose not to choose, because the default serves them 
perfectly well. It gives them what they want, without requiring them to take the necessary 
steps to obtain it. To test reactions to this question, I asked about seventy university 
students (in law, business, and public policy) the following question: 
 
Suppose that over the years, your favorite online bookseller has compiled a great 
deal of information about your preferences. It thinks it knows what you want before you 
do.  Would  you  approve  or  disapprove  if  the  seller  decides  in  favor  of  “default 
purchases,” by which it sends you books that it knows you will purchase, and bills you 
(though you can send the books back if you don’t want them)? (Assume that the relevant 
algorithm is highly reliable — accurate in at least 99 percent of cases — though not 
completely unerring.) 
 
Notably, 84 percent disapproved. Perhaps the problem is that the bookseller is 
enrolling people automatically, and without their consent, but significantly, a large 
majority  -- 70 percent – would also decline to sign up for a system. With a different 
population, recruited for Amazon Mechanical Turk, the results were broadly similar. Of 
fifty people, 86 percent rejected default purchases and 84 percent would decline to sign 
up. 
 
These results are a bit of a puzzle, because at first glance, the most serious problems 
with predictive shopping, and with the resulting defaults, involve accuracy, and in the 
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question, a high level of accuracy was stipulated. How can the survey results be 
explained? Perhaps people did not believe the stipulation. In the real world, of course, 
there is a risk that those who use the relevant algorithms will be self-serving. They want 
to sell their products, and they might assume a desire to purchase even when people lack, 
or would not form, that desire. To be sure, markets will discipline errors of this kind, and 
people should be able to return products that they do not want, but because of the power 
of inertia, many people will inevitably retain unwanted products.
118 It is also true that in 
the context of book-buying, many people affirmatively enjoy the opportunity to search 
among options, to find out what has arrived, and to choose accordingly. 
 
In addition, and more fundamentally, people’s preferences change over time, 
certainly with respect to books. We have seen that what people want this month might be 
quite different from what they want next month and the month after, when predictions are 
being made. People might like Stephen King novels in January, but have little interest in 
June, and predictive purchases will have an exceedingly difficult time capturing such 
changes. Even if the algorithms are extraordinarily good, they must extrapolate from the 
past, and that extrapolation might be hazardous.  
 
It is of course an empirical question, not a conceptual one, whether and to what 
extent changing preferences would confound predictive shopping. Perhaps the relevant 
predictions would be perfectly accurate, or nearly so, across certain domains. With 
respect to certain household items – soap, toothpaste, toilet paper – preferences do not 
much change, and automatic purchases, at the point of need, could be a great boon. 
Imagine a kind of household manager that would automatically supply, at a charge, 
certain products as soon as people run out. What would be wrong with that? I asked about 
seventy students the following question:  
 
Assume that at some point in the future, homes can be monitored so as to “know” 
when you run out of various goods, such as soap, paper towels, and toilet paper. Would 
you approve of a system in which the home monitor automatically buys such goods for 
you, once you run out? 
  
The strong majority – 69 percent – did indeed approve. It is noteworthy that 
people’s negative reactions to predictive shopping “flipped” compared to books when 
household items are involved. One reason may be that tastes are relatively static and 
errors are unlikely. Unlike in the context of book-buying, it is also not exactly a benefit, 
for most people, to choose among items of this kind. And in the event of some kind of 
error, people might not much mind the idea of having extra soap, paper towels, and toilet 
paper. Compare automatic renewal of newspapers or magazine subscriptions, which 
many people appreciate. 
 
Notably, a different population, recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk, did not 
approve of automatic shopping. In a group of fifty people, only 38 percent were in favor. 
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Perhaps the reason was skepticism about the neutrality and accuracy of the home 
monitoring system. For the relevant population, perhaps it was feared that the monitor 
would buy goods that people did not want or need. Skepticism about choice architects, or 
about household monitors, can lead people in the direction of active choosing, even if 




If the empirical problem posed by changing preferences could be solved, so that 
accuracy were not a problem, both welfare and autonomy might well be promoted by 
predictive shopping, and by assuming that people would prefer it, and would choose not 
to choose. The principal qualification is that automatic enrollment in programs of this 
kind might not make sense where people affirmatively like to make selections. The most 
forceful objection is that in many domains, the empirical problem cannot be solved – at 
least not yet. 
 
In these circumstances, the appropriate solution seems simple. People should not 
be defaulted into a system of “predictive shopping,” but they should be given an active 
choice about whether they want to enroll. Some algorithms might prove themselves over 
time, and some people might want to take their chances with them even if they have not 
been proved. A consumer might think: “I do not want to bother to shop; the seller knows 
me well enough to choose for me.” Other consumers might think: “I enjoy shopping; it is 
a benefit rather than a cost; and I don’t trust the seller.” In this domain, which is 
undoubtedly the wave of the future, people should be making active choices about when 




Choice can be either a great benefit, a kind of gift, or instead an immense burden, a 
kind of curse. In evaluating private and public institutions, and people’s diverse attitudes 
toward freedom of choice, it is crucially important to appreciate their frequent desire to 
choose and also their frequent antipathy toward choosing. If either is neglected, there is a 
risk that both low-level policy judgments and high-level theoretical claims will go badly 
wrong. 
 
Many people have insisted on an opposition between active choosing and 
paternalism, but in many contexts, the opposition is illusory, even a logical error. The 
reason is that some people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. To be 
sure, the power to choose may well have intrinsic value, but people often exercise that 
power by delegating authority to others. Nanny states forbid people from choosing, but 
they also forbid people from choosing not to choose. If choice architects are overriding 
that particular choice, they may well be acting paternalistically — at least if they are 
motivated by the belief that active choosing is good, notwithstanding the fact that people 
reject that belief. Insistence on active choosing may simultaneously reduce people’s 
welfare and insult their autonomy. The same concerns that motivate objections to 	 ﾠ 34 
paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic interferences with people’s choice 
not to choose. 
 
We have also seen that the argument for active choosing, or instead for some kind of 
default rule, depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. Where 
people are relevantly heterogeneous,
119 and where choice architects lack information or 
neutrality, active choosing has real advantages. But if a default rule is accurate, active 
choosing does not make a great deal of sense, at least when people remain free to go their 
own way if they see fit. When choice architects overlook this point, and nonetheless insist 
on active choosing, they might well be behaving paternalistically, and in a way that 
reduces both the welfare and the autonomy of those whom they are seeking to help.  
 
In such cases, choice-requiring paternalism should be avoided. The principal 
qualification – and it is an important one – is that such paternalism might be justified 
insofar as it operates in the interest of the free development of individuality.
120 In some 
settings, it is important for people to learn and to develop their values and preferences. In 
such cases, an insistence on active choosing can be seen as a way of promoting what 
might be taken as a form of self-expansion. 
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